Prevention is better than cure-this adage is particularly significant in the context of growing industrial sickness in the country. Fundamental to the criteria used by financial institutions and government agencies to identify sickness is the recurrence of cash loss. Dholakia argues that use of various criteria based on the cash loss syndrome delays identification of sickness and results in a high proportion of terminally sick units.
According to Dholakia, what is needed is a comprehensive set of empirically tested criteria which would serve as an early warning system. Abnormal fluctuations in a firm's relative position within the industry to which it belongs should be explicitly used to determine sickness at the incipient stage. This is likely to help prevent industrial sickness. However, this would require restructuring of existing systems and procedures adopted by the financial institutions.
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Closures of business units and corporate failures resulting in bankruptcies have become a normal feature in market economies the world over (Slatter, 1984; Kharbanda and Stallworthy, 1985) . Growing competition and the ever-changing international economic environment often lead to high incidence of corporate failures in developed market economies. However, these economies have the resilience to absorb the economic disturbances brought about by the closure of industrial units. In recent years, industrial sickness in India has reached alarming proportions. According to the Ministry of Finance, the number of sick units in the portfolio of commercial banks by the end of June 1987 stood at 1.60 lakh involving an outstanding bank credit of Rs 5,738 crore (Ministry of Finance, 1989) . In developing economies like India, the socio-economic consequences of corporate failures are hard to absorb. The government cannot treat them as normal occurrences associated with the process of industrial development and diversification.
In order to combat the problem of industrial sickness, a comprehensive assessment of the magnitude of industrial sickness and an analysis of the main factors which bring about sickness are necessary. Both prevention and cure of industrial sickness wpuld depend on our ability to identify sickness as early as possible and analyse its causes. Faulty or delayed identification would reduce the effectiveness of the remedial action such as restoring the financial viability of sick units and protecting units which would become sick. This paper examines the criteria used by official agencies in India to identify industrial sickness and points out the limitations of these criteria.
around 8 thousand to 146 thousand. Outstanding bank credit has recorded a seven-fold increase during this period.
Because of the explosive growth in the number of sick units in the small scale sector, bank credit tied up in sick small scale units has recorded a yearly growth of 27.4 per cent although, during this period, outstanding credit per unit has actually decreased. Bank credit to sick units in the small scale sector has increased from less than 17 per cent in 1980 to around 27 per cent in 1986. However, a large quantum of bank credit is still tied up in large units.
Industry-wise incidence of industrial sickness is given in Table 2 . Engineering and textiles account for more-than half of the outstanding bank credit tied up in large sick units. Bank credit advanced to sick units in these two industries has also increased. While bank credit to large and medium industries increased from Rs 8,238 crore to Rs 19,170 crore during the period 1980-86, that to large sick units has increased from Rs 1,233 crore to Rs 3,239 crore. We also find that the relative incidence of sickness is increasing in some industries and decreasing in others. Empirical evidence indicates that the relative magnitude of industrial sickness is not high in all industries. Sickness appears to be more industryspecific than a general problem as such, especially in the case of large industrial units. The case of the cotton textile industry is illustrative of sickness being industry-specific.
Criteria for Identification of Sick Units
The Reserve Bank of India identifies sick industrial units on the basis of a mix of criteria including continued cash losses, imbalances in the financial structure, and deterioration in liquidity. "A unit may be considered sick if it has incurred cash losses for one year and, in the judgement of the Bank (RBI), it is likely to continue to incur cash losses for the current year as well as the following year and the unit has an imbalance in its financial structure such as current ratio of less than 1:1 and worsening debt equity ratio" (RBI, 1978) .
Term lending institutions identify sickness on the following criteria:
• continuous defaults in meeting four con secutive half-yearly instalments of interest or principal of institutional loans • continuous cash losses for a period of two years or continued erosion in the net worth by 50 per cent or more
• mounting arrears on account of statutory or other liabilities for a period of one or two years (Bidani and Mitra, 1983) .
The most stringent definition is given in the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act of 1985, which defined a sick unit as "An industrial company (being a company registered for not less than seven years), which has at the end of any financial year accumulated losses equal to or exceeding its entire net worth and has also suffered cash losses in such financial year and the financial year immediately preceding such financial year,"
These definitions view sickness in terms of extreme deterioration in the financial health of the unit. However, the criteria do not warn sufficiently well in advance about the impending closure of a unit. For instance, the wiping out of the entire net worth of a unit accompanied by at least two consecutive years of cash loss clearly signals extreme form of sickness which would in fact take the enterprise to the brink of closure. Similarly, severe cash losses with persistent defaults in institutional debt servicing also indicate fairly advanced stage of sickness on the part of the industrial unit, though this stage would certainly precede the stage of complete erosion of the net worth of the unit. The criteria, in fact, delay the identification process by at least a couple of years or more.
Early Identification Helps
Timely action to help sick units requires early identification of sickness and for this purpose, it is necessary to identify other symptoms. In the case of large units whose shares are quoted in stock exchanges, a signal of sickness is sent when dividends are skipped and share price sharply declines. It is not uncommon to come across cases where despite dividends being skipped, shares continue to be quoted above par. This measure, therefore, will have to be used very cautiously with other identifiable symptoms to judge whether skipping dividends indicates sickness or represents a temporary downward slide in financial performance.
Use of Cash Loss Criterion
The cash loss criterion adopted by the official agencies does not involve any attempt to evaluate the normal profitability of a representative unit in a
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given industry. Subnormal profit may either indicate the onset of sickness or serve as an early warning signal for sickness. In this context, another relevant criterion to identify sickness is the relative performance of a unit vis-a-vis other firms in the industry. Business fluctuations and changes in the economic environment do not affect the profitability of different firms in the same manner. A pronounced downswing in business conditions or a recession in a given industry would bring about a general decline in the average profitability of that industry. However, it is likely that some units would be affected by these fluctuations far more seriously than others. In favourable conditions, almost all firms in industry, including newcomers, earn fairly high profits. Even marginal or inefficient firms with relatively high cost of production also make profits. When the boom is over, marginal or relatively inefficient firms are the first ones to show a sharp decline in profitability, the decline far exceeding the general decline in the industry. Eventually, these firms are likely to become sick.
Recent studies have shown that cash loss is not a sudden occurrence and actually represents only a continuation and aggravation of a trend already in evidence. Gupta (1983) has shown that in the early stages (i.e. up to six years preceding the cash loss period), the profitability index shows a marginal decline, followed by sustained decline during three years preceding the cash loss period and continuous cash loss during the subsequent period.
Concept of Weak Units
The recent RBI guidelines facilitate the detection of sickness at the incipient stage but only for large and medium units. An industrial unit will be termed as "weak," if at the end of any accounting year it has:
• accumulated losses equal to or exceeding 50 per cent of its peak net worth in the im mediately preceding five accounting years • a current ratio of less than 1:1 • suffered a cash loss in the immediately preceding accounting year (Ojha, 1987) .
On the other hand, a small scale industry (SSI) unit should be considered sick if it has:
• incurred cash loss in the previous account ing year and is likely to continue to incur cash loss in the current accounting year and has an erosion of 50 per cent or more of its net worth • continuously defaulted in meeting four consecutive quarterly instalments of interest or two half yearly instalments of principal on term loans with persistent irregularities in the operation of its credit limits with the bank (Ojha, 1987) . While identifying weak units and initiating necessary remedial measures in respect of such units at the stage of 50 per cent erosion of their net worth is a step in the right direction, it will be prudent to distinguish between a newly established unit and ongoing units and long established units. In newly established units with an operating period of about five years, 50 per cent erosion of net worth with an inadequate current ratio would only indicate that the unit had essentially failed to take off as a successful business unit and is perhaps sick from the stage of inception itself. A well established business unit with a long operating period could have accumulated high reserves and surplus and a fairly sound equity base. It would take more than two years to accumulate losses to wipe out more than half of the net worth of such a unit or even longer if it was successful. Thus, by the time this unit reaches the level of 50 per cent erosion of its net worth, the process of sickness may have already reached a fairly advanced stage.
Any deterioration in the performance of the unit which goes beyond a previously defined normal range of business fluctuations should be subjected to careful scrutiny. Continuous monitoring of the performance of business units in this manner is likely to be a strenuous, time-consuming, and costly affair especially since cases of prolonged sickness though reduced will continue.
Assessing Potential Viability
The RBI guidelines require commercial banks to undertake viability studies of sick industrial units. "The rehabilitation of sick units has to be very selective and systematic" and "there is no point in throwing away further resources in support of the units which are irretrievably sick"(Ministry of Finance, 1986) . Thus, only potentially viable units are to be restored to normal health with rehabilitation packages.
A sick industrial unit is regarded as potentially viable, if, in the opinion of the bank assessing its viability, "it would be in a position, after implement-ing a package of concessions spread over a period not exceeding seven years from the commencement of the package, to continue to service its repayment obligations as agreed upon, including those formulating part of the package, without the help of any further concessions ... after the aforesaid period" (Ministry of Finance, 1986) . Repayment period for restructured debts should not exceed ten years from the date of implementation of the package.
We can see from Table 3 that the number of large sick units which can be considered potentially viable has steadily decreased. The number of nonviable units has, on the contrary, increased. The obvious conclusion is that industrial sickness in large units is accompanied by a more rapid growth of totally non-viable units. This aspect of industrial sickness deserves urgent attention of policymakers.
Restructuring of Procedures Overdue
To conclude, it is possible to design models which can predict sickness in industry. Studies by Kaveri (1980) , Srivastava and Yadav (1986) , Vinod Kumar (1987) , and Yadav (1986) suggest that empirically validated predictive models can be built to monitor corporate sickness. A more comprehensive model incorporating non-financial data can also be formulated but it would become more complex. Moreover, banks and financial institutions would already have systems for collecting and processing financial data. With some modifications and improvements in data collection and processing, it may be possible to predict industrial sickness among large industrial units financed by banks in a manner that would minimize the incremental cost of generating such predictions.
It is obvious that financial institutions will have to play a major role in detecting and preventing sickness at the earliest possible stage. A recent study by Khandwalla (1988) has identified financial institutions' own procedures and practices as an important cause of industrial sickness. Restructuring the procedures adopted by financial institutions for identifying and monitoring industrial sickness appears to be overdue.
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